Here's why Hinkie's plan for 76ers could work

So the other day a sportswriter asked me when I went on Sam Hinkie's payroll.

The question came after everyone learned that Joel Embiid would miss another season because of his injured right foot, and it was both revealing and cutting. It said something about how divisive a figure Hinkie has become over his 26 months as the 76ers' general manager, and it compelled some self-reflection: In writing about Hinkie's rebuilding plan, have I crossed the line between explaining why it could work and becoming a cheerleader for it? The last thing a sports columnist should be is a homer.

I reviewed everything I've written about the Sixers since Hinkie's hiring. I don't think I've led cheers. I've gone as far as saying, We'll see how everything turns out. Nevertheless, I can't deny that there has been an undercurrent of approval for Hinkie's strategy, mostly because I've tried to analyze it as I have the strategies of the Eagles, the Flyers, and the Phillies.

Over the last 32 years, Philadelphia has celebrated one championship among its four major sports franchises, so the notion of "doing it the way it's always been done" ought to be verboten around here. That's why the culture-change theme that once burned so hot around the Flyers has cooled since GM Ron Hextall began taking a tack different from the organization's traditions. That's why I'm willing, for now, to give Chip Kelly the benefit of the doubt when it comes to his radical reconstruction of the Eagles' roster. That's why the Phillies deserve every bit of ridicule they get.

But Hinkie seems to have inspired reactions - in support and in opposition - that are more visceral. Sides have been chosen. Any gray area is gone. No matter how nuanced your opinion, someone is ready to label you: Either you're a stuck-in-the-past coot who can't see the crystal logic of the Sixers' maneuvers, or you're a Hinkie apologist who defends every decision the man makes even while he drags the franchise down into the swamp's depths.

What follows, then, is a good-faith attempt to explain why Hinkie and the Sixers generally have been doing the right thing and what they have done and might yet do wrong. Let's begin with one of the primary objections, maybe the overarching objection, to Hinkie's plan:

It's embarrassing, even unethical, for a proud NBA franchise to tank.

The results over Hinkie's first two seasons as GM have been ugly: 37 victories, 127 losses, a conga line of marginal NBA players dancing into and out of the Wells Fargo Center. In truth, though, those results haven't been much uglier than the Sixers' recent history. Over the 10 years before Hinkie's arrival, the Sixers had two winning seasons and won one playoff series. From 1999 through 2003 - the five seasons that comprise the apex of the Allen Iverson era - the Sixers advanced beyond the second round just once, reaching the 2001 Finals and getting smashed by the Lakers. Before that stretch, they missed the playoffs for seven consecutive years, averaging 26 wins a season, and that was when they were trying to win.

As for the ethics, I find it difficult to criticize the Sixers for tanking when the NBA's system to acquire new talent - an amateur draft in which the worst teams have the greatest likelihood of getting the best players, who in turn can have outsized impacts on teams' fortunes - incentivizes tanking.

Come on. You don't have to tank to build a terrific NBA team.

No, but you have to be bad, at least for a little while, and even then you have to have great timing and/or luck. Since 1983, the last time the Sixers won the NBA title, just nine teams have won the league's 32 championships. The NBA has been top-heavy for a long time, because once a team acquires a transcendent player, it tends to stay great while that player is there. You have to get those kinds of athletes. Sometimes you stumble into them.

OK, so why can't you put a competitive team on the floor and try stumbling?

You could. The Sixers did for years, and it got them trapped in the NBA's netherworld: rarely bad enough to secure a high lottery pick, never good enough to challenge for a championship. A team might build itself into a contender by mining mid-to-late first-round picks and second-round picks, but the odds of that approach working are much slimmer compared to the fortuitousness of obtaining a top-five pick and having the draftee develop into a superstar. Hinkie has tried to maximize those odds, both by stripping the Sixers to bones and by hoarding draft picks. Remember: They will likely have four in next year's first round.

Fine, but you still have to hit on those picks.

Agreed, and it seems Hinkie has missed on two big ones so far. Drafting Embiid was a calculated risk, a swing for the fences, and if Embiid never becomes the franchise cornerstone the Sixers hoped he would be, Hinkie will have made the wrong decision for the right reasons. The other mistake was Michael Carter-Williams, and by trading Carter-Williams to Milwaukee, Hinkie effectively admitted that he erred in drafting him.

So you acknowledge the plan might not work?

Of course. But that's not the point. No rebuilding plan is assured of working. The point is that Hinkie's plan could work, in a big way, and even if it doesn't, the Sixers can't be worse off than they were before he showed up. We'll just have to see how everything turns out.

msielski@phillynews.com

@MikeSielski