Recent Phillies drafts haven't produced position players

Benny Looper wandered over to a back field one afternoon this spring to watch some minor-league Phillies take batting practice. As assistant general manager of player development, it is Looper's job to see that the Phillies can one day replace an aging core with young and productive players.

"There are a lot of position players in our organization that we like," said Looper, taking a seat in a blue folding chair. "One of them is right here."

The bald, folksy Oklahoman pointed at Roman Quinn, a diminutive, switch-hitting shortstop chosen with the 66th overall pick in 2011. The 19-year-old prospect has accomplished everything asked of him. But at best, Quinn could be a major-leaguer by 2016.

He is emblematic of a Phillies system that has failed to produce position players since the franchise-changing drafts that procured, among others, Jimmy Rollins, Brett Myers, Chase Utley, Cole Hamels, and Ryan Howard. But Quinn could be the next Rollins or the next Greg Golson.

Though if recent history repeats itself, Quinn will not reach the majors - at least not with the Phillies. Since Howard was selected in the fifth round of the 2002 draft, the Phillies have picked and developed one position player who ultimately started for a major-league team. That was Michael Bourn, a fourth-round pick in 2003 and later an all-star with Houston.

The baseball draft is not like its football or basketball counterparts; players usually require years of development. Projections are highly speculative. There are more rounds in the baseball draft, and the futility is boundless. No one is expecting the Phillies' recent drafts to yield immediate results.

But the four-draft cycle of 2004-07 was a tipping point. While the Phillies were drawing attention by opening a new ballpark, spending more money in free agency, and fostering new homegrown stars, the draft stagnated.

With success, the team picked lower, forfeited first-round picks, and gambled on high-risk draftees. Recent trades stripped the Phillies of advanced prospects. The result is an older roster and a dearth of talent in the higher levels of the minors to replace it.

"You can't burn the candle at both ends," said Marti Wolever, a Phillies assistant general manager who runs the team's draft. "If your club is getting older and you're picking later and you don't have the picks and you're not going to spend it internationally, something is going to give here, fellas. And it's just a matter of when it's going to give. We're getting to that point."

Jim Callis has studied the baseball draft for 20 years and obsesses over its intricacies. He is executive editor for Baseball America, a magazine that tracks the best players in high school, college, and the minors. Each June, 30 major-league teams select some 1,500 players, and his staff tries to make sense of it by surveying front-office executives across the game.

Baseball is often called a game of failure. It extends to the drafting process.

"In a typical draft - this sounds crazy because of how many players you draft - but if you get one solid player, that is probably par," Callis said. "If you get two solid players, that is exceeding it."

The higher the pick, the better the terrible shot is. There are few ways around it. But the Tampa Bay and Washington organizations suffered for years, accumulated high draft picks, and finally evolved into contention.

Annual contenders such as the Phillies or Yankees rely on free-agent acquisitions and trades. Still, there were ways to enhance their odds in the draft despite being saddled with a low pick.

"Money doesn't guarantee success in the draft," Callis said. "But, obviously, the more money you spend, the more talent you're bringing in. You still have to evaluate."

Under Major League Baseball's old collective bargaining agreement, the commissioner's office set a "slot" recommendation for draft bonuses. It was strictly a recommendation, and there were no penalties for exceeding the suggested amount.

In 2011, for example, the last draft under the old rules, the Pirates spent $13 million on their first two picks alone, which was more than any team had ever spent on an entire draft.

Agents would deter small-market teams from picking a certain player because of bonus demands. Some teams would regularly exceed the slot to entice prospects to skip college. The Phillies rarely participated in such activity. Team president David Montgomery, a longtime ally and friend of Bud Selig, followed his wishes.

"We were going to play by those rules," Wolever said. "A lot of clubs didn't. It started getting carried away, hence the new rules. From my perspective, I would like to spend whatever I can spend. It would be great. But we weren't able to do that."

Draft data from Baseball America demonstrates the handicap. In 2004, the Phillies spent $3.4 million on their top 10 picks, which ranked 21st in baseball. (They picked 21st in every round that year.) Without a first-round pick in 2005, they were 29th in spending over the first 10 rounds at $1.8 million.

They spent $4.8 million total on 51 picks, which ranked 19th in 2006. (Their average pick was 21st.) In 2007, the Phillies picked 19th and spent $4.2 million on draft bonuses to rank 20th.

"It's fairly indicative they weren't spending extra money to go over slot," Callis said.

The new rules prevent abusing the system. If teams do not follow the commissioner's slot recommendation, there are severe taxes and forfeiture of future picks. Money is no longer an influence.

"You have to scout again," Wolever said.

After former Phils scouting guru Mike Arbuckle selected righthander Gavin Floyd with the fourth overall pick in 2001, he handed control of the draft to Wolever. His first pick was a high school shortstop named Terry Jones who never advanced past single A. His next pick was a stocky college first baseman named Ryan Howard.

Since then, the Phillies have followed a philosophy of picking players with "tools" or high upside. With that, of course, comes higher risk. It is a tenet of former general manager Pat Gillick's evaluation model.

"Can we do better? Certainly we can do better," Wolever said. "I don't think it's anything with development. Maybe we just haven't taken the right players. Maybe that's part of it. Maybe we should give more thought to 'baseball players' per se, than high-ceiling guys. But that's the philosophy we have kind of adhered to."

The first four picks in 2004 were Greg Golson, Jason Jaramillo, J.A. Happ, and Lou Marson. All four eventually were traded for varying returns. In 2005, he selected Mike Costanzo, Matt Maloney, Michael Durant, and Brett Harker, a group that has combined for 59 career major-league games.

The 2006 draft provided trade pieces in Kyle Drabek, Adrian Cardenas, Andrew Carpenter, and Jason Donald. All have yet to establish themselves. Joe Savery was their first pick (19th overall) in 2007 and was followed by Travis d'Arnaud, Travis Mattair, and Brandon Workman. D'Arnaud, now with the Mets, was used to acquire Roy Halladay and could ultimately be a major-league regular. Workman never signed, over a $75,000 dispute.

The Phillies hope Domonic Brown, selected 607th overall in 2006 and an example of good scouting, can finally become an everyday player in 2013.

From 2004 to '07, the Phillies drafted 26 players who have made the majors. They have combined for 0.7 wins above replacement, a statistic that estimates a player's overall contribution to his team. For example, according to Baseball-reference.com, superstar Mike Trout had a WAR of 10.7 in 2012, meaning he accounted for 10.7 more victories than a readily available replacement player would have produced.

Technically, it is worse. Vance Worley was drafted in 2005 but did not sign until drafted again in 2008. Remove him from the 2004-07 equation and the WAR output drops to minus-3.7.

During that same period, their National League East rivals Washington (58.4 WAR from draftees), Atlanta (57.8), New York (22.0), and Miami (18.2) have fared better. But only the Braves had a lower average pick than the Phillies.

Looper said the draft or international market is the most cost-efficient way of obtaining a regular player, but pointed to the team's acquisition of Jayson Werth (waiver claim) and Shane Victorino (Rule 5 draft) as proof of successes elsewhere. Those instances are rare, though, and long ago.

If anything, the Phillies have adeptly scouted their own talent to decide who was expendable. None of the recently traded prospects have made a difference.

"Looking at it from the major-league level, it doesn't matter how we acquire them so long as we get good quality, everyday players on the field," Looper said. "We certainly hope some of those would come through the draft because you'd have control of them for a while."

Then Looper, a baseball lifer, started listing the names. Cody Asche looks sharp at third base. Tommy Joseph (obtained in a trade) could be the future catcher. Carlos Tocci is 17 and full of promise. Maikel Franco is just 20 and blossomed last season. And Quinn, just look at the way he runs the bases.

"A lot of these younger guys I like," Looper said. "Four years from now, it'll sift its way out, and some of them won't be as good as I thought. Some of them will get hurt. Something will happen where they won't make it."