More than one mistake

By Daniel L. Davis

Since David Petraeus resigned as CIA director because of a sex scandal, many journalists and pundits have argued that his service to the nation should not be dismissed because of one "mistake." An evaluation of the former general's record, however, shows that he made far more than one mistake, and that the consequences for the nation and thousands of individuals have been profound. It's time for the shroud of popular myth to be removed from Petraeus' war record.

Recent reports quoted U.S. Sen. John McCain as calling Petraeus one of "America's greatest military heroes," adding, "His inspirational leadership and his genius were directly responsible - after years of failure - for the success of the surge in Iraq." The senator was misinformed. The evidence is clear that the ultraviolent actions of the terrorist organization al-Qaeda in Iraq were the chief cause of U.S. success associated with the surge.

It was only when Sunni insurgents regarded al-Qaeda in Iraq as a greater threat than the U.S.-led coalition that they changed sides and the trajectory of the war. Petraeus deserves credit for recognizing that development and ordering U.S. troops to support Sunni insurgents against al-Qaeda. But key ground commanders told me in numerous interviews that if al-Qaeda had not made profound strategic mistakes, irrespective of Petraeus' strategy, we could still be fighting in Iraq today.

The popular myth that the general's strategy was the pivotal factor had disastrous consequences for the war in Afghanistan. Despite considerable evidence that counterinsurgency tactics used in Iraq could not be successfully reprised in Afghanistan, Petraeus chose to apply them anyway.

In media interviews and congressional testimony, Petraeus repeatedly suggested that the strategy was working in Afghanistan. But in serving and traveling extensively in the country during the surge, I saw that it most certainly was not.

It's sobering to consider the consequences that have accrued to the United States as a result of accepting Petraeus' version of events without examination. Evidence has continued to pile up over the past year to confirm that our efforts in Afghanistan since 2009 have failed in every important strategic respect.

The Afghan government remains one of the world's most corrupt; Pakistan remains an open conduit for violence; Afghan security forces still have marginal capabilities; and the Taliban may have increased in proficiency. And, perhaps of greatest concern to our future security, the al-Qaeda movement has expanded its reach considerably, gaining a foothold in many more countries.

Aside from the strategic implications, the Petraeus myth has inflicted a serious human cost. Since the former general's flawed strategy was applied in Afghanistan, tens of thousands of American service members have paid for it with their lives, limbs, and emotional well-being.

It's worth noting that when Gen. William Westmoreland told Congress how well the Vietnam War was going in April 1967, he was hailed as a hero and interrupted by applause 19 times. But years later, when an honest evaluation of his performance was made and the truth was laid bare, his name became a byword for military failure.

Before too many more get carried away lauding Petraeus with such superlatives as "one of the great American battlefield commanders," let's look at what actually happened in Afghanistan. Especially as we consider what strategy to pursue in the final two years of the mission, that reexamination must begin now. We should not sacrifice any more American lives for a flawed strategy.