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Attorney criticizes article by Inquirer

Sections of a letter sent to Inquirer Editor William K. Marimow and staff writer Craig McCoy from Dion G. Rassias of the Beasley Firm L.L.C.:

Sections of a letter sent to Inquirer Editor William K. Marimow and staff writer Craig McCoy from Dion G. Rassias of the Beasley Firm L.L.C.:

"Mr. McCoy's conduct with respect to Mr. Justice Seamus McCaffery and his wife Lise Rapaport, Esquire, has been professionally troubling and an assault upon fundamental journalistic ethics and First Amendment values. Mr. McCoy, with the advice, consent and encouragement of The Philadelphia Inquirer's Editor-in-Chief and the Editorial Board, has engaged in a repeated course of conduct that has disparaged the reputations of both the Justice and Ms. Rapaport repetitively, excessively and completely without basis. In an era of heightened judicial scrutiny, you should be ashamed that you have distorted and manipulated innocuous facts and transactions in an effort to undermine and stain the reputations that the Justice and Ms. Rapaport have worked their lifetimes to earn.

If he did not know before, Mr. McCoy has undoubtedly learned throughout his "investigation" that referral fees are eminently proper and Ms. Rapaport has done absolutely nothing wrong, at any time. He has also learned that while the fact of her referral fees is a matter of public disclosure due to her husband's status as a member of the judiciary, any details other than the source of the referral remain private matters between her, her clients and the attorneys to whom these matters are referred. In his quest to undo or circumvent such well-settled law, Mr. McCoy has also learned that Ms. Rapaport has been a licensed attorney since 1979, and has practiced law in various capacities prior to working within the court system. As an Ivy League-educated attorney with both an excellent reputation and a magnetic personality, she has been and is still frequently consulted by many of her past clients and wealth of friends seeking legal advice and representation. When she was practicing law, she would represent these people herself, or would refer them to attorneys who she believed would best protect their interests. Once she began working within the court system, she stopped practicing law, although she continued to refer individuals who asked for her assistance and direction.

The question of recusal arises only with respect to issues that would compromise a jurist's ability to be fair, impartial and apply the law as he or she understands it. Of course, the necessary precursor to any such recusal analysis would be that the jurist actually knows of any connection between the jurist and the lawyers and law firms that appear before the Supreme Court. Given the volume of matters that the Court routinely handles, that "knowledge" is not nearly as obvious as Mr. McCoy pretends. If the recusal rules were as rigid as Mr. McCoy would like them to be (or will apparently erroneous report them to be), there would likely never be a full complement of justices in every case, and recusal motions - which are rare to begin with, because lawyers themselves are acutely aware of the standards - would be filed in great abundance.

Let us at least try to be clear and agree on one thing. You have no interest whatsoever in Ms. Rapaport's legitimately earned referral fees. That is simply a masquerade for you to attack and malign the Justice . . .

I would never advise clients to speak with you under circumstances as clear as these.