GAO raises questions on Osprey

WASHINGTON - The V-22 Osprey's performance during its 19 months in Iraq was substandard, and the Pentagon should review whether the tilt-rotor aircraft's cost and reliability merit continuing the program, congressional auditors said.

The Osprey's components wear out too soon, making it too costly to maintain and grounded too much of the time, the Government Accountability Office said.

The Defense Department has spent $28 billion on the Osprey, buying 206 planes to date. It plans to spend $25 billion more on upgrades and the purchase of the remaining 252 planes in the 458-aircraft program for the Marine Corps and Air Force Special Operations Command.

The Osprey is jointly built by Textron Inc. and Boeing Co., including at Boeing's Ridley Township, Pa., plant.

Given the "significant funding needs" to complete the program, "now is a good time to consider the return on this investment as well as other, less costly alternatives that can fill the current requirement," the GAO said in a report released yesterday at a hearing of the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee.

The committee chairman, Rep. Edolphus Towns (D., N.Y.), called for a halt to the V-22's production. "It's time to put the Osprey out of its misery," he said.

The GAO report is the first independent assessment of the V-22's Iraq performance. The aircraft has been in development for 20 years, and Marine Corps officials have said it is likely to be deployed in Afghanistan this year.

The Osprey has rotors that tilt, allowing it to take off and land like a helicopter. The military sees it as useful for long-range Marine Corps and commando missions such as those the Marines anticipate in Afghanistan.

David Ahern, a Pentagon acquisition official, defended the aircraft's effectiveness in Iraq but said the GAO "properly identifies reliability and availability concerns."

Ahern said the Pentagon saw no need for a reassessment of the program of the scope the GAO recommended, but "future adjustments to planned quantities may be appropriate," he said.

Pentagon performance reviews of the Osprey in 2000 and 2001 criticized it for deficiencies including problems with its design, safety, and reliability. Subsequent reviews concluded that the problems had largely been corrected.

The V-22 did not face heavy combat conditions in Iraq. The first squadron of 12 arrived in October 2007, after the once-heavy fighting in Anbar province had died down.

While it flew its assigned missions successfully, maintenance problems left the number of planes available for flight at rates "significantly below minimum required levels," the GAO said.

During three periods studied during the V-22's deployment, from October 2007 through April 2009, the planes were available for combat operations on average 68 percent, 57 percent, and 61 percent of the time, "while the minimum requirement" is 82 percent, the GAO said.

These low rates were on par with other V-22 squadrons in the United States, it said.

In addition, the 12 planes arrived with nearly three times the spare parts required, yet some parts wore out more quickly than expected, creating shortages that forced maintenance crews to cannibalize components from these planes or get them from U.S.-based Ospreys.

The constant repairs put the V-22's flying cost at $11,000 per hour, double the original estimate.

Ahern defended the plane's performance in Iraq.

"The V-22 is arguably the most survivable, versatile and capable medium-lift airframe in the Iraq theater," he wrote, and "evidence in the report leads to a conclusion that the V-22 was operationally effective in Iraq."

Tom Dolney, a spokesman for Textron's Bell Helicopter unit, said by e-mail that, while the companies had not seen the GAO report, "we've been working with our customers and the Osprey industry team to identify components, support activities and designs that will improve aircraft availability. Several improvements are already in place."