Several years were wasted in encouraging Iran to suspend its uranium-enrichment program by making this a precondition for talks. We should give President Obama credit for dropping this futile condition and for the recent start of negotiations. Only direct contact can determine if agreement is possible.

The signals are mixed. After the recent suicide bombing in southeast Iran, outside countries were blamed for supporting groups responsible for the attack. However, meetings last week in Vienna may show if Iran is willing to go through with an apparent readiness to send most of the uranium it has so far enriched to a low level for further enrichment in Russia. Such a development would mean a drastic reduction in Iran's stock of enriched uranium. However, it would not tell us if there is an Iranian readiness to negotiate about the original program.

Some are convinced that Iran seeks to develop a nuclear weapon. The issue is not really dispositive of the current negotiations. Even if Iran were to have no such intention today, it could change its mind tomorrow. The issue, then, is persuading Iran to abandon its enrichment program.

Both incentives and disincentives have been tried. To justify harsh punitive measures, some wish to show that the Iranian government is lying. However, trying to shame Iran will not improve the chances of agreement - which should be the most important objective. Moreover, sharp economic sanctions and military measures could have dire consequences and rally nationalist-minded Iranians to support a government the majority otherwise opposes.

Earlier European messages to Iran have pointed to possible rewards, such as support for civilian nuclear power construction and membership in the World Trade Organization. These incentives have evidently not been enough. It does not mean that diplomacy is exhausted. After 30 years of no diplomatic relations with the United States and recurrent U.S. reminders that all options "are on the table" - including military options - perhaps assurances against attack and of diplomatic relations could carry some weight in the negotiation.

A broadening of the agenda for discussion has been suggested. Iran has said it is ready to take up the subjects of nonproliferation and disarmament. These items could offer new openings. Even the subject of a Mideast free of weapons of mass destruction could be broached. That idea could be expanded to an area free of uranium enrichment and plutonium production. All countries in the region have supported the concept, but for Israel it has always been a very remote possibility.

Israel may look at its nuclear weapons capability as insurance against a possible existential threat. However, this perception could change if one or more states in the region were to develop nuclear weapons or move close to weapons capability by enriching uranium or producing plutonium. To avoid such a situation, perhaps Israel would consider an agreement under which all countries in the region would renounce and eliminate nuclear weapons as well as nuclear fuel cycle installations.

Such thinking may be far from the mind of current Israeli leaders, but isn't it preferable to its usual response to nuclear activities? Bombing Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 and, in 2007, attacking Syrian installations claimed to be a North Korean-designed research reactor? Or more recent threats to bomb Iranian installations?

Today, with Iran and other states in the Middle East moving into nuclear activities, the zone idea has new appeal. For Iran, giving up enrichment within the framework of a zone would be different from acting unilaterally. It could contribute to a broader goal of regional disarmament and nonproliferation.

I do not underestimate the problems, such as verification or of outside assurances of security and supply of uranium fuel. Yet, if the Obama administration is serious about nonproliferation and disarmament, a bold, broad approach is needed. The problem is difficult, but by no means insoluble.

Hans Blix was director of the International Atomic Energy Agency for 16 years, and the lead inspector for alleged Iraqi WMD. Tonight in Philadelphia, he will receive the John and Chara Haas International Peace Award from the Project for Nuclear Awareness at the Double Tree Hotel. For more information, visit www.projectfornuclearawareness.org.