In Afghanistan, U.S. needs a steady push

Megan Ortagus

is the director of communications for the Institute for the Study of War

Wade Zirkle

is a former Marine infantry officer and founder of Vets for Freedom

On July 2, Operation Dagger commenced in Southern Afghanistan, with more than 4,000 U.S. Marines and 650 Afghan soldiers moving out of fortified bases to destroy Taliban safe havens and protect a war-weary population. This operation begins the long-awaited implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy after almost eight years of ineffective, piecemeal operations.

As President Obama oversees this effort, coupled with an increase of 21,000 U.S. troops, some pundits say Afghanistan is now his war. But that is just another example of the often-shallow political calculations that dominate discussions in Washington. Afghanistan is our war.

As such, Obama should aggressively communicate his end goals and vision for a stable Afghan state. His surge, while necessary, faces unique challenges that could make a new strategy nebulous if his administration is not vigorous in preparing the public for an extended commitment. Already, liberal members of Congress have formed a caucus determined to end the president's new approach to the Afghan conflict before it has even started.

Having just returned from Afghanistan, we have the view that the stakes and the costs of the war are not tidily compatible with one another. This war is by most measures a low-intensity conflict. It is not a hopeless Vietnam-like quagmire and does not have to be a "Graveyard for Empires." Afghanistan in 2009 is also not spinning out of control at the hands of an intractable sectarian war as was Iraq in 2006. While the war is not on the brink of catastrophe, the reconstitution of the Taliban, a destabilized border with Pakistan, and a marked increase in violent attacks mean decisive resolve is needed now to avoid a prolonged stalemate.

We believe policymakers should consider the following points as the United States wades further into one of our nation's longest-running wars.

Aside from the isolated Pakistani border regions in the eastern and southern fringes of the country, most of Afghanistan exists in relative calm. Violent incidents, although at a 31 percent increase from 2008, remain almost parallel or slightly higher to what coalition forces are experiencing in Iraq. Although we do not like comparing casualty rates from previous conflicts, Afghanistan is nothing like Vietnam. On average, 485 U.S. lives were lost per month in Vietnam, while in Afghanistan it is 8.

Certainly, the recent increase in violence is cause for concern, but understand the context: A counterinsurgency strategy to protect the population and defeat the enemy must employ an offensive posture. This more aggressive approach will spike coalition casualties in the near term. We believe this new strategy is comprehensive and appropriately relies on the hard power of killing and clearing enemy groups in order to secure the population and create the conditions for soft-power solutions. Ultimately, a successful U.S. and NATO withdrawal is dependent on political accommodations that only a stable society can produce.

Additionally, it is clear the Taliban is not rapidly taking terrain or winning popular support. A new Gallup poll shows that when Afghans are asked whom they would like to govern, the Taliban and religious clerics each receive only 1 percent. While enemy attacks are becoming increasingly complex and brazen, our conversations with senior military commanders suggest there is no evidence that the Taliban is gaining influence or winning "hearts and minds." On the contrary, it appears that while the insurgency in Afghanistan is more indigenous than the one in Iraq, the motivations remain largely economic. U.S. soldiers have labeled their enemy the "$5-a-day Taliban," rightly pointing out that what we have mistakenly called Taliban are in fact "accidental guerrillas" looking for money to provide food and shelter for their families.

Due to the almost eight years of coalition assistance, Afghans are gradually seeing the benefits of cooperation with the West. Roughly two million girls have access to education for the first time, and democratic elections are beginning to foster the idea of self-rule. The coalition must effectively communicate these advancements in order to highlight the imperfect but improved life under a democracy that rejects terrorism and refuses to house its actors.

Communications will be key in maintaining the domestic support needed for success. Obama must make the case that the sacrifice of more American lives, billions more in development, and another decade of intensive U.S. involvement in a volatile region is in the country's best interests.

It would be naïve to think we can create a utopia in Afghanistan, but getting this war right is the vital task of the administration and our generation.

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